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Experimental repetition 
What is the value of replicating other studies? 
Caroline L Park 
In response to a question on the value of replica-
tion in social science research, the author under-
took a search of the literature for expert advise 
on the value of such an activity. Using the in-
formation gleaned and the personal experience 
of attempting to replicate the research of a col-
league, the conclusion was drawn that replica-
tion has great value but little ‘real life’ 
application in the true sense. The activity itself, 
regardless of the degree of precision of the repli-
cation, can have great merit in extending under-
standing about a method or a concept. 
Dr Caroline L Park, RN, is Associate Professor, Centre for 
Nursing and Health Studies, Athabasca University, 1 University 
Drive, Athabasca, Alberta T6S 3A3, Canada; tel: 1-800-788-
9041 ext. 6381; email: clpark@athabascau.ca 
AST YEAR I NAÏVELY SUBMITTED a 
proposal for funding review indicating that I 
was going to replicate the study of a col-
league. When the review comments came back to 
me one of them was: ‘What is the value of replica-
tion?’ I was initially quite offended by this com-
ment. Not having any nonverbal clues with which to 
associate the question, I assumed it was facetious. 
The answer is self-evident, isn’t it? 
I have learned, in my later years, to mull things 
over. A few days later I started wondering if I had 
interpreted the comment correctly. This wondering 
led me to the literature, starting with Neuliep’s 
(1990) Handbook of Replication Research in the Be-
havioural Social Sciences. Now that I’ve read the 
views of many experts, and have replicated my col-
league’s research, I feel better prepared to answer 
what I now consider was a serious question. 
The lone researcher 
The basic reason that research must be replicated is 
because the findings of a lone researcher might not 
be correct. Rosenthal (1990) wrote that unreplicated 
research might reflect unidentified error caused by: 
undetected equipment failure; rare, possibly random 
human errors of procedures — observation, re-
cording, computations or reporting; the results might 
be a random ‘fluke’ and/or the outcomes might re-
flect individual organismic differences and/or sys-
temic experimental effects. Or, as Miller had said in 
1980 (cited by Lamal in 1990), ‘The fact that a the-
ory has passed one test provides no evidence at all 
that it will pass a repetition of the test.’ We have 
reached a point in social science research where some 
feel that ‘the literature is replete with one-shot studies 
of phenomenon whose veracity is unquestioned and 
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whose findings are disseminated as implicit laws’ 
(Easley et al, 2002, page 83). This strong assumption 
is not echoed by all. Many qualitative researchers feel 
that there have been enough studies in their concept 
field to support practice and yet, their theory is still 
questioned and the findings are not disseminated. 
Research that is totally quantitative — i.e. weights 
and measures — can be replicated with great accu-
racy or precision. This is the basic assumption be-
hind high school chemistry labs. Under optimum 
conditions, with specific directions and pure ingredi-
ents, most high school students succeed in replicat-
ing the research assignment. So, we know it is 
possible. The theory being tested is supported again 
and again and becomes part of our general knowl-
edge system. Regardless, even these ‘quantitative’ 
experiments are not always successfully replicated, 
for a myriad of reasons, some of which have been 
cited already. Some of us were never able to get it 
‘right’ in the chemistry lab but the research was rep-
licable. 
Precision, or accuracy, of a replication to imitate 
the research under question is much more difficult to 
obtain when we move away from weights and meas-
ures, and into behavioural science. The more qualita-
tive a study, the more difficult it is to show 
replicability, let alone to replicate. Does that mean 
that it is of no value to try? 
Precision of replication 
According to Rosenthal (1990) replications are ‘rela-
tive’, depending upon how close they are to the 
original study, in terms of subjects, experimenters, 
tasks and situations. One purpose of replication, or  
an attempt to replicate, is to strengthen the founda-
tion of a theory so that it too will become a part of 
our general knowledge system. Another is to test its 
veracity or truth to determine if it should be sup-
ported as knowledge at all. Table 1 shows the effects 
on this knowledge-building of successful and unsuc-
cessful replications. It does not matter if the replica-
tion is precise or not. It can still have an effect and 
this effect can be positive or negative. This means 
that both precise and imprecise replications have 
value. 
Table 1 introduces an interesting concept: that of 
damage to a researcher’s reputation if their work is 
not replicable. Successful replication and building of 
a theory is obviously advantageous to a researcher’s 
reputation. Neither of these will happen if no one 
ever tries to replicate another researcher’s work. 
When a replication successfully confirms the 
findings of the original study it proves at least 
some support for the theory concerned. When a 
theory repeatedly fails to be replicated it is 
more plausible to regard the original findings as 
a result of chance factors or idiosyncrasies of 
the context, rather than the manifestation of 
real structures or mechanisms. (Tsang and 
Kwan, 1999, page 770) 
Amir (1990) reiterated the assumption, which I be-
lieve is widely held, that before a result can serve as 
a basis for theory it must pass tests of reproductabil-
ity and generalizability. ‘Reproductability’ means 
that a particular psychological aspect or phenome-
non found to occur in a certain sample occurs in 
similar samples, and ‘generalizability’ means 
whether it occurs in different types of groups as 
well. Reproductability is replicability. Generalizabil-
ity goes a step further but also supports the theory 
and is replication. 
‘Implicit in all our discussion of replication is the 
idea that the original study is worth replicating’ 
(Rosenthal, 1990, page 7). Rosenbaum (2001) indi-
cates that poorly designed studies tend to replicate 
even when incorrect. He also cautions against repli-
cating a hidden bias. 
Determining the precision of a replication 
Hendrick (1990) provided eight aspects to consider 
in replication research (see Table 2). I thought about 
each of these in relation to my own replication of 
Garrison et al’s (2000) ‘cognitive presence’ re-
search. The original study is a content analysis of 
students’ postings to discussion boards in online 
university courses to assess if a coding tool ‘is a 
practical approach to judge the nature and quality of 
discourse in a computer conference’ (page 4). The 
postings are coded using a hierarchical listing of 
cognitive levels. The study appeared to be quantita-
tive, in that content was counted and calculated into 
comparison figures. In fact, the definitions of the 
categories of cognition are very subjective and the 
coding of student postings into a specific category is 
likewise. 
Hendrick (1990) also discusses four types of rep-
lication: conceptual, partial, exact and systemic. Us-
ing the data in Table 2, I would have to assume that 
my replication was partial because there are distinct 
differences in some of the aspects but also some 
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8able 2. Hendrick’s aspects: similarities of two studies
spect Original study My replication 
.  subject characteristics  Graduate students in two different courses at 
a traditional university participated in a 
discussion conference as part of a course. 
There is no data on demographics of 
students, or prior learning experiences 
Graduate students in one totally online course 
in a distance virtual university conducted all of 
their communication, student to student and 
student to faculty on line. There is no data on 
demographics of students, or prior learning 
experiences 
.  specific research histories of subjects – 
prior experiences and or methods used to 
get them into the study 
–  previous research history not known 
–  volunteers solicited via email. Self-select 
from within a group 
–  senior course, students had experience 
with technology and online conferencing 
–  consent form built into courses 
–  all students in the course participated 
.  historical context – social cultural systemic 
factors relating to time and place 
–  web-based course within larger, urban, 
bricks-and-mortar university. The 
participants had the opportunity to meet 
and talk outside of the discussion 
–  totally online course at distance university. 
The students never met face-to-face 
.  general physical setting of the research –  online conferencing –  online conferencing 
.  control agent –  none –  none 
.  specific task variables –  web C. T. course 
–  two faculty 
–  different instructions 
–  web C. T. course 
–  one faculty 
–  different instructions 
.  primary information focus –  cognitive categories developed by team 
–  definition of terms by team 
–  cognitive categories developed by original 
researcher 
–  definition of terms adjusted to reflect the 
understanding of this team 
.  modes of data reduction in presentation –  Atlas.ti for content analysis –  Atlas.ti for content analysis esearch Evaluation December 2004 191 
xperimenter effect 
nother important concept raised by Rosenthal is 
experimenter effect’. He believes that not only are 
xperimenters with different research interests dif-
erent kinds of people, and that different kinds of 
eople are likely to obtain different data from their 
ubjects, but also that researchers can hold an area of 
nterest in common but hold opposite expectancies 
bout the results of any given experiment. When it 
omes to team research, he believes it is reasonable 
o assume that colleagues or faculty and students in 
he same department will be highly correlated by 
oth natural selection and training factors. Morse 
nd Mitcham (2002) describe a similar observation 
ore recently, in the language of qualitative research 
s ‘conceptual tunnel vision’. Researchers often 
ver-categorize their data, assigning more data to the 
oncept under study than actually belongs to it  
page x). 
Rosenthal’s concept of researcher differences is 
ot explicit in the eight aspects listed by Hendrick 
ut is perhaps implicit in several. I would expect, as 
 know a little bit about the original research team, 
hose work I replicated, that the expectations we 
ach held at the start of the research may have been 
imilar, but our philosophies of research and educa-
ion were most likely different as we came from dis-
iplines that hold different views about qualitative 
esearch. Within the realm of social science re-
earch, the continuum of values for quantitative and 
ualitative methods produces multiple interpreta-
ions of what replication means. 
Using Hendrick’s (1990) eight aspects to consider 
in a replication as a guide, it is a wonder that any re-
search in the social sciences would ever be considered 
a true replication. This being the case, as Bornstein 
(1990) says, our ‘exclusive reliance on imprecise rep-
lication serves to protect the professional reputation 
of the original investigator’ (page 74). 
Alternative views about replication 
1. Only ‘falsification’ is conclusive 
Popper would argue that only the falsification of a 
proposition, through empirical processes, is conclu-
sive. Many recall the white/black swan analogy. Fal-
sification requires attempted replication. ‘Some 
propositions are more reliable than others because 
over time they have stood up better to disciplined at-
tempts to refute them’ (Hutcheon, 1995, page 4 of 
11). This view of replication values only ‘failed ef-
forts to prove them [propositions] false’ as corrobo-
rative (Hutcheon, 1995, page 4 of 11), and requires 
exact replication to be meaningful. As Collins 
(1992) stated in 1985, in pure replication ‘the second 
experiment would amount to no more than reading 
the first experimental report for a second time’ (page 
34) and therefore would have no added value. 
2. Multiple replications by multiple researchers 
McKelvie (1990) believes that ‘no single study can 
simultaneously control all extraneous variables. 
–  coders selected and trained by this team 
–  potentially different interpretations of the 
codes 
–  coders selected and trained by this team 
–  potentially different interpretations of the 
codes 
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Therefore repeated replication by independent inves-
tigators is the only guarantee that a phenomenon is 
robust’ (page 83). Different studies by independent 
researchers, controlling different extraneous vari-
ables, might not be viewed by many as replication. 
At a minimum, that type of research would fall into 
Hendrick’s (1990) category of conceptual replica-
tion, ‘an attempt to convey the same crucial structure 
of information in the independent variables to sub-
jects, but by a radical transformation of the proce-
dural variables’ (page 45). Hendrick believes this 
type of research to be high-risk. When the results are 
equivalent there is increased confidence in the origi-
nal experiment, but if the replication fails the study 
is practically worthless. Collins (1992) had pre-
sented a similar view earlier saying: ‘a confirmation, 
if it is to be worth anything in its own right, must be 
done in an elegant new way or in a manner that will 
noticeably advance the state of the art’ (page 19). 
Rosenbaum (2001) agrees in principal, saying, 
‘The epidemiologist’s alternative to exact replication 
is the consistency of a result in a variety of repeated 
tests’, a consistency ‘not dislodged in the face of di-
versity’ (page 82). Qualitative researchers might call 
this ‘searching for the negative case’, and it has a re-
lationship to Popper’s falsification argument. 
Rosenbaum believes that studies designed with ap-
plications that are varied enough to eliminate one or 
more of the rival explanations for the original find-
ings are particularly valuable. 
3. Achieving a degree of replication 
Tsang and Kwan (1999) believe that we cannot cre-
ate a scientific laboratory in the real world because 
the world is constantly changing and learning. In 
other words, exact precision is not possible in the 
real world. Regardless, they conclude that the falli-
bility of social science research makes replication 
even more important, even if ‘the achievability of 
replication is a matter of degree’ (page 763). 
They present labels or degrees of replication 
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theoretical development able 3. Degrees of replication 
 Same measurement 
and analysis 
Different measurement 
and analysis 
ame data set 1.  Checking the analysis  2.  Re-analyzing the data
ame 
opulation 
3.  Exact replication 4.  Conceptual extension
ifferent 5.  Empirical 6.  Generalization and page 766) to describe different replication activities. 
ach cell in the chart would have a different degree 
f precision of replication with #1 (having same data 
et and same measurement and analysis) having 
reatest precision, and #6 generalization and exten-
ion least precision (see Table 3). 
. ‘Good enough’ replication 
ing et al (2003) devised a reconceptualization of 
eplication. They propose planning and conducting 
nternal replications at the time of the original study 
s well as accepting the concept of ‘good enough’ 
eplications. Good enough can be applied if 
it supports or verifies an earlier study with sig-
nificant theoretical contributions and implica-
tions where a strict replication may not be 
feasible; it employs identical dependent and 
key independent variables (though measure-
ments may differ) at the same level of analysis; 
it studies the same phenomenon with an argua-
bly superior research design and different 
population. (page 539) 
hey also introduced the concept of ‘ex-post identi-
ication’. It is possible that there are published stud-
es, which could be viewed as ‘good enough’ 
eplications of other studies in the same field, even 
hough replication was not the original intent. Using 
opulation generalization extension able 4. Focusing replication research 
 Degree of theory development 
Degree of 
methodological 
development 
Limited Substantial 
Limited e.g. knowledge management [an emerging field] 
Action: checking analysis and data, exact replication, 
empirical generalizations and conceptual extension 
Focus: prediction and verification for theoretical dev. 
e.g. resource-based view of firm [substantial theory dev. 
but has not progressed adequately in methodology dev.] 
Action: exact replications and empirical generalizations to 
improve methodological aspects.  
Focus: verification and falsification 
Substantial e.g. strategic groups [some progress but inadequate  e.g. diversification, alliances [a field with well-developed Research Evaluation December 2004 
n for 
theoretical and methodological foundations] 
Action: generalization and extensions 
Focus: broaden understanding through interdisciplinary 
replications, unique methods or radically different data 
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meta-analysis of key papers and defining research 
streams, supporting and non-supporting replications 
are identified. Not all researchers, obviously, are go-
ing to agree with ‘good enough’. In an editorial 
commenting on meta-analysis,  Steinthal (1994) 
stated that constructs and measures used in the stud-
ies included in a meta-analysis should be identical, 
although this is seldom achieved. 
Sing et al (2003) want to encourage replications 
that seek to verify, especially in emerging fields, and 
that seek to extend or falsify basic theory because 
they believe that this will have the largest impact. 
Table 4 is their concept for focusing replication re-
search in management theory (page 543). 
4. ‘Ambivalence’ towards replication 
Some researchers in the interpretive or constructivist 
paradigm of critical theory believe that their qualita-
tive methodologies ‘are now well accepted as re-
spected ways of developing in-depth understandings 
about phenomenon of interest to nursing’ (Berman et 
al, 1998, page 1). The validity or comprehensiveness 
of their findings is enhanced by combining research 
methods or ‘methodological triangulation’. These 
researchers state that the principles for conducting 
research evolve from and operationalize the para-
digm assumptions.  
The following four areas would be affected by 
such assumptions: the relationship between the re-
searcher and the subjects; the epistemological as-
sumptions about the nature of knowledge and who 
are legitimate ‘knowers’; the extent to which subjec-
tive meanings are valued and incorporated into the 
process of analysis and dissemination of result; and 
the design and conduct of the research. I don’t be-
lieve that, under these research conditions, replica-
tion is an option. 
Tsang and Kwan (1999) pick up on the critical 
theorists’ ‘ambivalent attitude towards replication’, 
describing those researchers ‘who contend that the 
principle of replicability should not be imposed on 
them as “overreacting” and “in danger of landing on 
relativism, which denies the possibility of objective 
truth”’ (page 701). 
Lately a new, yet old, methodological term has  
re-emerged — MOPS, Agar’s (2004) acronym  
for multiple overdetermination patterns. Agar’s 
definition is ‘different data sources — both seren-
dipitous and sought after — are used to build these 
new conceptual schemes and to test them against 
additional data’ (page 103). I found overdetermina-
tion patterns in a neuroscience research article by 
Bechtel (2002). He credits his definition ‘to align 
multi-experimental procedures to produce converg-
ing results’ to Campbell and Stanley’s work in the 
early 1960s. Originally overdetermination looked at 
multiple causes for the same phenomenon. These 
triangulation strategies can be used to support a con-
ceptual finding, but they are not replications of any 
degree. 
Probability 
It was Raman’s 1994 article that reminded me that in 
our behavioural research we need not have an all-or-
none approach. That’s why we have the concept of 
probability or ‘the degree of belief in a theory’ (page 
634). He concluded that ‘as we accumulate a history 
of successful replications, the more confidently we 
expect an additional successful replication but our 
confidence increases at a decreasing rate’ as the 
number of replications pile up (page 637). This was 
expanded upon by Wells (1993) when he asked, 
‘How large must the number of corroborating in-
stances be in order to conclude that a theory is ade-
quately established?’ His conclusion — there is no 
general answer. That didn’t help much. Wells be-
lieves that we should consider the following: who 
did the original study? is it highly ‘falsifiable’? and 
how much would it cost to perform another replica-
tion? when we are deciding if we have enough evi-
dence. The quality of the researcher is a very 
subjective measure. 
Pyett (2003), while discussing the importance of 
the quality of the researcher in determining the val-
idity of a study, points out that in qualitative re-
search the ‘theoretical position, interests and 
political perspective … is acknowledged and even 
celebrated’ (page 1172). In her article, she describes 
her personal value of the researcher’s characteristics 
and training, her following of guidelines in her own 
research, and her methodological rigor; and yet she 
states that she still needs to ‘have recourse to some 
test of reliability or validity’ (page 1172). 
Incentives for replication research 
If replication is vital to the validity of research find-
ings, why do we see so little of it in the social sci-
ence research literature? Bornstein (1990) is harsh 
when it comes to unreplicated research. 
Science is a political as well as an intellectual 
enterprise. It is clear that scientists are as likely 
as anyone else to use illogical — even circular 
— reasoning in evaluating empirical data. They 
distort scientific information — consciously or 
unconsciously — to render that information 
consistent with their a priori beliefs. (page 71). 
 
If replication is vital to the validity of 
research findings, why do we see so 
little of it in the social science research 
literature? 
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He goes on to explain that social science re-
searchers are reluctant to conduct replication studies 
because of the pressure to be original. If the re-
plication study proves the theory of the original 
study, publishers take a ‘ho-hum, so what?’ attitude. 
We already knew it. If the replication study does not 
support the original research, then the results are in-
significant and meaningless based on differences in 
any of the aspects described previously. 
Publishers and grant providers are interested in 
new and original research. As previously suggested, 
researchers have found very little academic reward 
in replication studies. A replication might be funded 
or published if the original research was controver-
sial, either a counter-attitudinal or counter-intuitive 
study. Collins (1992) describes research which ‘at-
tracted enough attention to cause other scientists to 
criticize and later to repeat’ (p.114) and concludes 
emphatically that ‘to question the results of a pas-
sage of scientific work amounts to an accusation. 
There is no middle way’ (p.150). Bornstein added 
that editors and reviewers view failures to duplicate 
more positively than successful replications (p.75). 
In the quantitative, bench-science research litera-
ture, there is much discussion and calculation of how 
many times any particular study must be replicated 
to be viewed as valid. This also leads to discussion 
of the ‘file-drawer syndrome’, where replications 
that do not support a theory never see the light of 
day. Do we get a warped perception from the repli-
cations published? When endeavouring to practice 
from an evidence base, it becomes difficult to know 
if all of the supportive and non-supportive studies 
are available in the literature. There may not be a 
similar problem in qualitative research because it is 
not often that two independent researchers attempt to 
come to the same conclusions from the same data. 
Conclusions 
Have I answered the question, posed in my title? I 
believe so. The value of replication is very great in 
theory development, whether it supports the tested 
theory or, more importantly perhaps, not. The prob-
lem is that it is seldom attempted because it is diffi-
cult to successfully accomplish and it carries more 
risk than potential reward for both the replicator and 
the originator of the research. Interestingly, most 
replications attempted are not ‘pure’ (i.e. partial) and 
therefore both researchers are ‘off the hook’ if their 
findings diverge because reasons beyond their con-
trol can always be identified as confounding factors. 
Collins describes this phenomena in great detail, 
through three case studies, supporting his belief of 
‘science as a cultural activity rather than a locus of 
certain knowledge’ (1992, page 1). Qualitative re-
searchers have developed tools, replacing replica-
tion, to add rigor, legitimacy and trustworthiness to 
their work. Methodological triangulation, meta-
analysis and MOPS are examples, but they do not 
appear to satisfy the reproductability need of many 
researchers and scholars. 
In my case, the replication that I undertook was 
only partial but the outcomes supported the original 
concept of using the cognitive presence tool to 
measure the levels of critical thinking demonstrated 
in computer conferencing. The act of implementing 
the replication was educational and led to many 
questions about the use of the coding tool and defini-
tions of terms, for which answers could not be found 
in the literature, or in conversation with the original 
researchers. As well, while the original researchers 
felt that their study was useful in assessing the prac-
tical value of the tool, they concluded that it was of 
marginal value because of the difficulties with inter-
rater reliability and the inability to link the outcomes 
of the levels of cognitive presence to other factors, 
such as student outcomes in the courses. We also 
had some inter-rater reliability issues stemming from 
unclear interpretations of the conceptual definitions. 
I believe our additional work on the tool added 
substantively to the conceptual development. The 
coders for my replication were graduate students in 
the program from which the conference data was ex-
tracted. They, and I in my teaching role, immedi-
ately saw serendipitous practical value from 
implementing the study. Merely identifying the lev-
els of cognitive presentation by students in course 
postings gave us insight into two common issues. 
The interpretation of student postings in conferences 
by faculty who are trying to grade participation is 
always difficult, and faculty are looking for strate-
gies to promote more meaningful postings by stu-
dents. These inductive findings from a deductive 
study will lead to further exploration and to profes-
sional development of faculty and orientation for 
students. 
I found the exercise of attempting to replicate the 
work of another researcher to be stimulating and 
valuable in many ways. My replication will be used 
to extend our understanding of the utility of the 
methodology in question and the concepts under in-
vestigation. I would recommend that researchers at-
tempt to replicate the work of major researchers in a 
conceptual field before beginning an extension of 
that work, particularly if they are not in frequent 
face-to-face discussion about interpretation of mean-
ing with the original researcher. Research built on an 
understanding of the original study is closer to repli-
cation than most meta-analysis. 
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